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HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY 
STANDING OVER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
Caitlin E. Borgmann* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One might expect that a Supreme Court decision addressing the 
constitutionality of a citizen initiative that bars marriage between same-sex 
couples would yield a predictable political division among both the Justices 
and Court commentators. Liberal Justices and commentators, one might 
conjecture, would want the Court to recognize a fundamental constitutional 
right to marriage equality, while conservative Justices and commentators 
would prefer the issue be left to the political process. The Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry reflected no such tidy outcome, 
however. The majority opinion addressing California’s Proposition 8 (“Prop 
8”), which amended the state’s constitution to exclude same-sex couples 
from legally recognized marriage, sidestepped the substantive issue through 
a procedural maneuver. Rather than reach the merits, the Court held that the 
official proponents of Prop 8, who had defended its constitutionality both in 
the district court and on appeal, lacked standing to appeal the district court’s 
opinion invalidating the initiative. The Court’s decision left marriage 
equality as the rule in California (although not elsewhere). Liberal Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan joined Chief Justice Roberts’s majority 
opinion, as did Justice Scalia, while conservative Justices Thomas and 
Alito, and liberal Justice Sotomayor, joined Justice Kennedy’s vigorous 
dissent. Some liberal commentators who favor marriage equality applauded 
the Court’s decision.1 
                                                
* Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. Thanks to the CUNY Law Review for 
inviting me to contribute this case comment. 
1 See, e.g., Suzanne Goldberg, A One-Two Punch to the Nation’s Most Prominent Anti-
gay Laws, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/a-one-
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It is of course not possible to know exactly what motivated each of the 
Justices in Hollingsworth. But standing is a doctrine that the Court has 
notoriously manipulated to reach desired results on the merits.2 
Commentators have widely speculated that the liberal Justices who sided 
with the majority preferred not to reach the merits either because they 
believed there were insufficient votes to find Prop 8 unconstitutional,3 or 
because they believed such a decision might be politically premature and 
therefore counterproductive, as it might prompt a backlash.4 Some 
proponents of marriage equality were quietly relieved by the Court’s refusal 
to address the merits, since it allowed the district court’s invalidation of 
Prop 8 to stand without risking an adverse Supreme Court decision that 
would be binding on all states.5 
Regardless of the Justices’ motivations, it is important to remember that, 
historically, limitations on standing have reflected a conservative impulse to 
close the doors of the federal courts to rights claimants and to expand the 
power of the political branches, especially the Executive branch.6 Justice 
                                                                                                                       
two-punch-to-the-nations-most-prominent-antigay-laws/; Nan Hunter, Commentary on 
Marriage Decisions by Matt Coles, HUNTER OF JUSTICE (June 26, 2013), 
http://hunterofjustice.com/2013/06/commentary-on-marriage-decisions-by-matt-coles.html 
(commentary by Matt Coles, Deputy Legal Director of the ACLU, asserting, “The majority 
opinion in Perry is not an indefensible duck of the marriage issue.”). 
2 See Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1452 
(1995) (“Doctrinal inconsistencies in the Supreme Court’s law of standing are now so 
commonplace that they have become relatively uninteresting. And the insight that the 
Court manipulates the law of standing to advance judicial policy preferences has become 
more fatuous than scandalous.”). 
3 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 2 (commentary by Matt Coles, Deputy Legal Director of 
the ACLU, suggesting that liberal Justices’ votes on the standing issue in Perry indicate 
“there weren’t five votes to take down Prop. 8”). 
4 See, e.g., Geoffrey Stone, Justice Ginsburg, Roe v. Wade and Same-Sex Marriage, 
HUFFINGTON POST, THE BLOG (May 12, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-
stone/justice-ginsburg-roe-v-wa_b_3264307.html (suggesting that Justice’s Ginsburg’s 
view that Roe v. Wade went “too far, too fast” might foreshadow her view of how to rule 
on marriage equality). 
5 See, e.g., Mike Sacks et al., Supreme Court Rules On Prop 8, Lets Gay Marriage 
Resume In California, HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2013) (observing that, as Chief Justice 
Roberts read aloud the Court’s decision in Perry, “Some of the same-sex couples who shed 
tears during Kennedy’s DOMA opinion continued to hold hands and nod their heads in 
agreement with Roberts. One woman, sitting with her partner, put her hand over her mouth 
as Roberts declared the defendants lacked legal standing, and therefore Proposition 8 
would be tossed out.”). 
6 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Is The Rehnquist Court Really That Conservative?: An 
Analysis Of The 1991–92 Term, 26 Creighton L. Rev. 987, 996 (1993) (“Conservatives 
have sought to constrict access to the federal judiciary both to advance federalism concerns 
and also as a way of decreasing protection of constitutional rights. Liberals want to ensure 
access to the federal courts to protect individual liberties and civil rights.”); infra text 
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Roberts’s majority opinion in Hollingsworth reinforces, and even tightens, 
the Court’s already cramped view of standing.7 Moreover, the failure of the 
Court’s four liberal Justices and Justice Kennedy to disregard politics and 
affirmatively declare Prop 8 unconstitutional leaves same-sex couples in the 
vast majority of states unable to exercise the rights that California couples 
now enjoy. In these respects, Hollingsworth is not a victory for 
constitutional rights. 
 
I.  THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS IN PERRY 
 
The same-sex couples who challenged Prop 8 in federal court named 
various state officials, including Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and 
Attorney General Jerry Brown, as defendants.8 These state officials 
answered the complaint, but they either refused to take a position on the law 
or agreed that the initiative was unconstitutional.9 All of the named 
defendants declined to defend Prop 8.10 Thereafter, the official proponents 
of the initiative under the California Election Code (“proponents”) moved 
to intervene to defend Prop 8. The district court orally granted the motion at 
a hearing, noting that neither the plaintiffs nor any of the named defendants 
had objected to it.11 The district court then held a trial, at which only the 
proponents presented witnesses and offered legal arguments in defense of 
the initiative.12 After the trial, the district court issued a detailed opinion 
holding Prop 8 unconstitutional.13 
The question of Article III standing appears to have been raised only 
                                                                                                                       
accompanying notes 77–85; see also Laura A. Cisneros, Standing Doctrine, Judicial 
Technique, And The Gradual Shift From Rights-Based Constitutionalism To Executive-
Centered Constitutionalism, 59 Case W. Res. 1089, 1100 (2009) (“The Warren Court took 
aggressive steps to increase public access to the federal court system, especially where 
plaintiffs had charged government actors — be they of the local, state, or federal variety — 
with violations of the law. For this reason, the Warren Court did all that it could to keep the 
standing bar low.”).* 
7 Adam Liptak has suggested that Chief Justice Roberts, while appearing to exercise 
judicial restraint, has deliberately moved the Court rightward in a “canny,” calculated 
fashion, using carefully planted language in seemingly modest opinions as support for 
subsequent bold and “deeply polarizing” decisions. Adam Liptak, Roberts Pulls Supreme 
Court to the Right Step by Step, N.Y. Times (June 27, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/us/politics/roberts-plays-a-long-game.html. If Liptak 
is right, Hollingsworth may prove to be a decision that, while garnering liberal votes today, 
the Chief Justice uses to make a more obviously conservative move in the future. 
8 265 P.3d 1002, 1128–29 (Cal. 2011).  
9 Id. at 1129.  
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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when the state officials chose not to appeal the district court’s decision. On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit first considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal,14 asking proponents to address “why this appeal should not be 
dismissed for lack of Article III standing.”15 The Ninth Circuit then certified 
to the California Supreme Court the question whether, 
 
under California Law, the official proponents of an initiative 
measure possess either a particularized interest in the initiative’s 
validity or the authority to assert the State’s interest in the 
initiative’s validity, which would enable them to defend the 
constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a 
judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials 
charged with that duty refuse to do so.16 
 
The California Supreme Court responded that the official proponents were 
authorized under California law to represent the interests of the state of 
California in defending Prop 8’s constitutionality.17 In a detailed opinion, 
the court recounted California’s long history of recognizing official 
proponents as proper parties to defend citizen initiatives. The court 
explained that granting proponents this authority was crucial to insuring the 
integrity and meaningfulness of the initiative process, which it explained 
had originated as a progressive response to public dissatisfaction with the 
state’s elected officials. The court noted that, under California law, 
proponents possessed standing to represent the interest of the people 
regardless of whether state officials were also defending the law, but it 
stressed the special importance of recognizing proponents’ standing when 
state officials declined to do so. 
The Ninth Circuit deferred to the California Supreme Court’s decision 
in determining that federal standing requirements were met. It stated, “All a 
federal court need determine is that the state has suffered a harm sufficient 
to confer standing and that the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
court is authorized by the state to represent its interest in remedying that 
harm.”18 The Ninth Circuit further found, “It is [the states’] prerogative, as 
independent sovereigns, to decide for themselves who may assert their 
interests and under what circumstances, and to bestow that authority 
accordingly.” The court relied in part on Karcher v. May,19 which held that 
the Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly and the President of the 
                                                
14 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). 
15 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Civ. No. 10-16696, slip op. at 2 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). 
16 671 F.3d at 1070.  
17 Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Cal. 2011). 
18 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1072. 
19 484 U.S. 72 (1987). 
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state’s Senate, appearing on behalf of the New Jersey legislature, could 
properly represent the State of New Jersey in litigation because “the New 
Jersey Legislature had authority under state law to represent the State’s 
interests.”20 
Having found that it could properly address the merits, the Ninth Circuit 
struck down Prop 8, but on different and narrower grounds than those of the 
district court. The California Supreme Court had previously interpreted the 
state constitution to require legal recognition of same-sex marriages.21 
Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. 
Evans,22 the Ninth Circuit found that Prop 8 impermissibly withdrew an 
existing right (the right to marry) from one group (same-sex couples) but 
not others, based solely on “a majority’s private disapproval of [gays and 
lesbians] and their relationships.”23 Because most states have never 
recognized the right of same-sex couples to marry, this decision was 
essentially limited in its impact to the state of California. 
 
II.  THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY 
 
A.  The Majority Opinion 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review both the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision on the merits and its determination of the standing question.24 
Because it found that proponents lacked standing to appeal, however, the 
Court never reached the merits. The Supreme Court mentioned without 
comment the district court’s decision to allow the proponents to intervene to 
defend the law.25 Instead, like the Ninth Circuit, the Court focused on 
whether the proponents had standing to appeal the district court’s 
invalidation of Prop 8. The Court found that, since the district court had not 
ordered the proponents “to do or refrain from doing anything,” the 
proponents’ interest in defending the constitutionality of a generally 
applicable state law did not amount the required “direct stake” in the 
outcome of appeal.26 The Court also found that the proponents’ unique role 
in the initiative process did not endow them with an individualized interest 
in defending Prop 8. Rather, the Court found, this role gave the proponents 
an interest only in seeing that the initiative process was properly carried out. 
                                                
20 Id. at 82 (citing In re Forsythe, 450 A.2d 499, 500 (N.J. 1982)). 
21 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
22 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
23 671 F.3d at 1095. 
24 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013). 
25 Id. at 2660. 
26 Id. at 2662. 
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Once the voters had approved Prop 8, the proponents’ interest in defending 
its enforcement was indistinguishable from “the general interest of every 
citizen of California.”27 
The Court was likewise unimpressed with proponents’ argument that 
state law authorized them to assert California’s interest in defending Prop 8 
and that they therefore need not show a personal interest in vindicating the 
measure. The Court found that, while states may appoint certain state 
officials as “agents” to represent them in federal court, proponents did not 
constitute such officials. The Court thus distinguished Karcher v. May, 
where the Supreme Court recognized Article III standing because New 
Jersey law provided that the Speaker and President of the state legislature 
could intervene in their official capacities to defend a state statute. 
The Court also relied on dicta in Arizonans for Official English v. 
Arizona28 to suggest that initiative sponsors could only have standing to 
defend an initiative’s constitutionality if state law expressly appointed them 
as “agents” of the state.29 Although the California Supreme Court had 
elaborated extensively on the long history of and rationale for allowing 
initiative proponents to represent the people’s interest under California state 
law, the majority was unsatisfied with that court’s declaration that the 
proponents thus possessed “the authority to assert the State’s interest in the 
initiative’s validity.”30 Despite this authority, the Court asserted, the 
proponents were “plainly not agents of the State — ‘formal’ or otherwise,” 
and their interest in the litigation was too generalized to meet the 
requirements of standing under Article III.31 Article III requires a “personal, 
particularized injury,” which the proponents here lacked.32 
 
B.  Justice Kennedy’s Dissenting Opinion 
 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor, 
dissented. While the majority saw the California Supreme Court’s 
opinion—and the Ninth Circuit’s deference to it—as an improper attempt to 
give unqualified private parties a “ticket to the federal courthouse,”33 Justice 
Kennedy maintained that “[p]roper resolution of the justiciability question 
requires . . . a threshold determination of state law.”34 Kennedy viewed the 
                                                
27 Id. at 2663. 
28 520 U.S. 43 (1997). 
29 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663 (citing Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65). 
30 Id. at 2660 (quoting Perry, 628 F.3d at 1193; Perry, 265 P.3d at 1007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
31 Id. at 2666. 
32 Id. at 2667. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
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California Supreme Court’s answer to this determination—its defining of 
proponents’ powers—as binding on the Court.35 
Not only did Justice Kennedy view the California Supreme Court’s 
determination as binding, but he agreed substantively with the court’s 
conclusion that official proponents were logical parties to represent the 
state’s interests in defending an initiative. He noted, “Proponents’ authority 
under state law is not a contrivance. It is not a fictional construct.”36 He 
found proponents’ commitment to the case “substantial,” their knowledge 
of the purpose and operation of the initiative significant, and their stake in 
the outcome sufficient “to provide zealous advocacy.”37 
Justice Kennedy disagreed with the majority that a formal agency 
relationship is necessary to satisfy Article III standing requirements,38 and 
he gave reasons why California might want to eschew a formal agency 
relationship.39 Moreover, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the initiative 
process furthers democratic principles. “The essence of democracy is that 
the right to make law rests in the people and flows to the government, not 
the other way around.”40 Kennedy maintained that the Court’s standing 
ruling frustrated the people’s decision to “exercise[] their own inherent 
sovereign right to govern themselves.”41 
 
III. A CRITICAL LOOK AT HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY 
 
A.  A Further Narrowing of Standing Doctrine 
 
The Supreme Court’s denial of proponents’ standing left several 
difficult and important questions perfunctorily addressed or wholly 
unexplored. One significant question that the Court failed to consider is 
whether there is a difference between the interests of the “People” and the 
interests of the “State” when state officials refuse to defend a duly passed 
initiative. In California’s process that resulted in Prop 8, the legislature 
played no part in enacting the initiative. Therefore, unlike in Karcher v. 
May, the public could not count on the legislature to defend the initiative 
the public had passed. If proponents’ standing were not recognized, the 
                                                
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 2670. 
37 Id. at 2669. 
38 Id. at 2672–74. 
39 Id. at 2671 (state may wish to limit its association with proponents to the narrow 
context of litigation; avoid bearing the cost of proponents’ legal fees; and avoid the “odd 
conflict” of having one formal agent defend the law while others attack its validity in the 
same litigation). 
40 Id. at 2675. 
41 Id. 
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named executive officials could essentially stymie the public’s will and 
deny it any possible federal court remedy simply by refusing to defend the 
law. On the other hand, to recognize proponents’ standing in such a case 
means that two parties—the state officials on the one hand, and the official 
proponents on the other—will simultaneously assert conflicting interests, all 
supposedly on behalf of the state. Suzanne Goldberg has argued that this 
result is intolerable.42 Moreover, she argues, the problem is not solved by 
asserting that the proponents represent the interests of the “People,” as 
distinct from the “state,” because the California Supreme Court itself made 
clear that to advance the People’s interests is to advance the state’s interests. 
The idea that a state could have different, conflicting interests that could 
be asserted by different parties is not without precedent in state law, 
however. In fact, although the California Supreme Court did refer to the 
“state’s” interest and the “People’s” interest interchangeably, it also 
expressly recognized that the state’s interests are often multi-dimensional. 
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has not found the idea of 
conflicting official positions on behalf of the “state” troubling. In Karcher, 
the Supreme Court recognized that, in the context of a statute enacted by a 
state legislature, a state could remedy executive branch officials’ refusal to 
defend the law by authorizing certain legislative members to do so. At the 
same time, the Court has said that it is perfectly proper for executive branch 
officials to decline to defend a law. Thus, the Court has contemplated one 
branch—a state legislature—arguing for constitutionality while another—
the state’s executive officials—takes the opposite position. This 
phenomenon, while arguably odd, recognizes that a “state” consists of 
separate branches with sometimes overlapping authority. In the case of 
citizen initiatives, the public operates as yet another “branch” of 
government whose interests (which may be described as those of the 
“People”) may not align with state interests as viewed by the legislative and 
executive branches.43 
Although Karcher addressed state legislators’—rather than initiative 
proponents’—authority to defend a law that the state’s executive branch 
refuses to defend, the Court’s refusal to acknowledge its similarities to the 
Prop 8 situation seems disingenuous. In both cases, there was clear state law 
authorizing alternative parties to defend a law when the state’s executive 
                                                
42 Suzanne Goldberg, Article III Double-Dipping: Proposition 8’s Sponsors, BLAG, 
and the Government’s Interest, 161 U. PA. L. Rev. Online 164, 170 (2013). 
43 Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011). Justice Kennedy might go further to say 
that the “People’s” interest is not only independent of, but takes precedence over, that of 
the governmental branches, whose power derives from the people. See Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct..at 2671, 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
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officials refuse to do so.44 The Court emphasized that in Karcher the 
individuals authorized by state law to defend a statute were state officials 
(the President and Speaker of the New Jersey legislature), not private 
parties. The Court found it “significant” that, when the two individuals who 
had originally held those seats lost those positions, the Supreme Court had 
held they also lost their authority to defend the statute.45 But New Jersey 
law had clearly authorized the President and Speaker, not these particular 
individuals, to defend the law. It is unsurprising that, once they no longer 
occupied those positions, the individuals were no longer entitled under New 
Jersey law to represent the state. No similar loss of official status occurred 
to the Prop 8 proponents. The California Supreme Court found that 
California initiative proponents do possess the authority to defend an 
initiative’s constitutionality should the sued state officials decline to do so. 
An initiative need only ever be defended on the merits once the initiative 
has become law and the initiative process is complete. Thus, in the 
California Supreme Court’s view, proponents in this case had not lost their 
status as the initiative’s official proponents or their authority to defend the 
law merely because the initiative process had ended. 
The majority attempted to circumvent this point by reading Karcher to 
forbid any private parties to represent the state’s interest. The Court noted, 
legislators “Karcher and Orechio were permitted to proceed only because 
they were state officers, acting in an official capacity.”46 The sentence’s 
passive voice leaves its precise point unclear, however: permitted by 
whom? If the Court is making a point only about what New Jersey 
permitted, the statement is unsurprising and would not seem to foreclose the 
possibility that another state might recognize a different delegation of 
authority, especially with respect to a citizen initiative. 
If instead the Court meant that Article III permits only a state’s 
delegations of authority to state officials and not to private parties, it does 
not explain why that is so. After all, if the initiative proponents in Perry lost 
any particularized interest in defending the initiative once it became law,47 
the legislators in Karcher likewise could demonstrate no greater interest in 
enforcing the law in question once it became law than any other legislator 
or citizen of New Jersey.48 Conversely, if state-granted authority to defend 
                                                
44 In Perry, this authority was not expressly granted by statute or the state constitution, 
but the California Supreme Court could not have been more emphatic in affirming 
proponents’ power under state law to defend the constitutionality of initiatives. See 265 
P.3d at 1015–1026. 
45 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2657. 
46 Id. at 2665. 
47 Id. at 2659. 
48 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Private Parties, Legislators, and the Government’s Mantle: 
On Intervention and Article III Standing 1–43 (2012),(Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & 
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the state or people’s interest is sufficient to give a state official the requisite 
“ongoing interest” to satisfy Article III,49 it is hard to imagine why the same 
authority should not similarly suffice for private parties such as initiative 
proponents. 
The Court’s answer to this may lie in its emphasis that state officials, 
unlike initiative proponents, hold an agency relationship with the state 
under traditional agency law.50 The Court seems to suggest that this agency 
relationship creates a more specific and sharper interest, perhaps because of 
the consequences flowing to an agent who fails to meet his or her legal 
responsibilities.51 This explanation is not fully satisfactory, however, given 
the discretion vested in state officials to decide whether or not to defend a 
law. In Karcher, for example, the state legislators may have been authorized 
under state law to defend a statute’s constitutionality, but they certainly 
were not required to do so.52 Although the Court is correct that legislators 
who fail to do so must contend with the public’s potential reaction through 
the electoral process, this does not explain why initiative proponents who 
affirmatively choose to defend a law and are clearly strongly interested in 
seeing the law upheld somehow have a weaker interest than a state official. 
Perhaps, instead, the Court’s point is that proponents’ interest, however 
strongly felt, is not sufficiently tied to the state.53 The Court warned that 
initiative proponents’ independent status means they are freer than state 
officials to make whatever arguments they choose, “without the need to 
take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public opinion, or 
potential ramifications for other state priorities.”54 Again, however, it is not 
clear why this should be relevant to whether a case or controversy exists 
                                                                                                                       
Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 12-325, 2012) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193601 (discussing grant of 
intervention in Perry and questioning whether initiative proponents should be granted 
intervention of right to defend the constitutionality of initiatives) (hereinafter 
Goldberg,Government’s Mantle). 
49 The traditional standing inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff has demonstrated 
an “injury in fact.” Defendants need not make this showing, of course, but the Court has 
found that they must “have an ongoing interest in the dispute, so that the case features that 
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of the issues.” Camreta v. Greene, 
131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
50 For its agency argument, the Court relied heavily on an amicus brief that presented 
this agency argument. Brief for Walter Dellinger, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 
768643; see also Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2657–58 (citing Dellinger brief). 
51 See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666 (“petitioners answer to no one”). 
52 See Karcher, 484 U.S. at 80; see also Perry, 265 P.3d at 528–29 (discussing state 
officials’ discretion in determining whether to defend a law).  
53 See Goldberg, Government’s Mantle, supra note 47, at 35. 
54 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667. 
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under Article III. If the state is satisfied that the party in question will 
adequately represent its interests, what constitutional purpose is served in 
second-guessing that conclusion? 
Whatever the reasons for it, the Court in Hollingsworth seems to hold 
that a private party who does not possess formal agency status can never 
adequately represent a state’s interest, regardless of whether the state 
believes it can do so. This importation of agency concepts into standing 
doctrine is a significant and new elaboration of what Article III requires 
when a state law is challenged as unconstitutional, and it serves to further 
narrow the ability of citizens to meet Article III standing.55 
As concerned as the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth was with 
proponents’ standing to appeal, it never addressed their standing to defend 
the law in district court in the first place. The Supreme Court appeared to 
assume that an Article III case or controversy existed there,56 but it did not 
explain why. The district court had granted intervention of right,57 but the 
question of federal standing is a separate inquiry that must be satisfied 
before a federal court can exercise jurisdiction.58 If the proponents lacked a 
sufficiently particularized interest to defend the initiative on appeal, it is not 
evident why they possessed such an interest at the district court level. And 
while intervenors may not separately have to meet standing requirements if 
another defendant already does,59 here the proponents were effectively the 
sole parties defending the law not only on appeal but also in the district 
court. 
The Court may have concluded that a case or controversy existed, 
regardless of the proponents’ standing, because the state officials continued 
to enforce Prop 8 throughout the litigation, even though they refused to 
defend the law.60 INS v. Chadha provides support for the idea that an Article 
III case or controversy exists so long as the Executive continues to enforce a 
challenged law, even if it agrees that the law is unconstitutional.61 However, 
in Chadha the Court did concede that “prudential, as opposed to Article III, 
concerns” rendered important the lower court’s identification of an 
                                                
55 Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163 (1992) (noting Court’s trend, led by Justice Scalia, toward 
tightening Article III standing requirements); see alsoHollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2672–73 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court’s reliance on formal agency principles). 
56 See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660. 
57 See id. at 2670; see also Goldberg, Government’s Mantle, supra note 47,at 14–15 
(discussing grant of intervention in Perry and questioning whether initiative proponents 
should be granted intervention of right to defend the constitutionality of initiatives). 
58 Goldberg, Government’s Mantle, supra note 47, at 18–19. 
59 Id. 
60 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660. 
61 462 U.S. 919, 938–40 (1983). 
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alternative party—in this case both houses of Congress—to defend the 
statute’s validity.62 Whether characterized as a prudential or constitutional 
concern, the Executive branch’s agreement that a law is unconstitutional 
and its refusal to present any legal defense whatsoever63 should raise serious 
concerns to a Court that has emphasized so strongly the importance of 
“adverseness” in constitutional litigation.64 “[F]ederal courts will not 
entertain friendly suits, or those which are feigned or collusive in nature.”65 
If continued enforcement is alone sufficient to establish standing, state 
officials who object to a state law on policy grounds could essentially 
conspire with plaintiffs to seek its invalidation by enforcing the law, while 
otherwise agreeing with plaintiffs that it was unconstitutional and refusing 
to present a defense. This seems to be precisely the kind of “friendly suit” 
that the case or controversy requirement was meant to prohibit. 
The state officials’ refusal to defend the law at the trial court level is 
thus a sufficiently significant issue that the Court should have addressed it 
in Hollingsworth.66 This is particularly so since the Court viewed the 
proponents, unlike Congress in Chadha, as lacking the requisite authority to 
defend the initiative. The Court should have at least addressed the difficult 
question of how a state could simultaneously side with plaintiffs on the 
substantive legal questions and be sufficiently adverse. Recognizing the 
proponents’ authority to represent the people’s interest in defending a duly 
enacted initiative would have been one way out of this thicket.67 
                                                
62 Id. at 940.  
63 See Perry, 265 P.3d at 1130 (noting that “Proponents were the only party in the 
district court to present witnesses and legal argument in defense of the challenged initiative 
measure”). Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 930-–31, 931 n.6 (stating that INS did not lose 
“aggrieved party” status required for appeal merely because the Executive might agree that 
the statute in question was unconstitutional, but noting separate requirement that an appeal 
“present a justiciable case or controversy under Art. III,” a requirement met in this case 
“because of the presence of the two Houses of Congress as adverse parties”).  
64 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
65 Flast, 392 U.S. at 100 (1968) (citations omitted). 
66 Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Op–Ed, Prop. 8 Deserved a Defense, L.A. Times (June 28, 
2013), available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-chemerinsky-
proposition-8-initiatives-20130628,0,3109622.story (agreeing with Court’s standing 
analysis but expressing concern about allowing “a few officials to nullify an initiative by 
not defending it” and suggesting reforms). 
67 The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), 
may provide another clue as to the Court’s lack of concern about adverseness. In Windsor, 
the Court addressed the merits of a challenge to a provision of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) despite the fact that the Obama Administration agreed that the 
statute was unconstitutional. The Court found that “a controversy sufficient for Article III 
jurisdiction” existed because the Administration nevertheless refused to grant plaintiff Edie 
Windsor the monetary relief she sought. See id. at 2686. Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion 
in that case remarked on the majority’s striking disregard of the once paramount 
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Viewed in the specific context of Prop 8, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
decision in Hollingsworth seems somewhat mystifying. The Chief Justice, 
joined by Justice Scalia, appears to go out of his way to prevent a duly 
enacted citizen initiative from being defended in federal court. The Court’s 
standing decisions since the 1970s have justified demanding criteria for 
standing as necessary to protect the political branches from encroachment 
by the judiciary.68 The Court repeated this admonition in Hollingsworth.69 
Yet here, the Court’s narrow interpretation of standing doctrine facilitated 
the judicial invalidation of a law adopted through the political process. The 
Court’s continued insistence on separation of powers rationales to support 
its cramped standing doctrine thus seems out of place in Hollingsworth.70 It 
is important to look beyond the facts of the case, however, and to recognize 
that the decision is consistent with the Court’s general trend of limiting 
citizens’ access to the federal courts in order to protect the power of the 
political branches, especially the Executive branch.71 This trend has largely 
been harmful to rights claimants. Beginning with the Burger Court, and 
continuing through the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, standing has come to 
serve a rigid gatekeeping function that often undermines citizens’ ability to 
challenge oppressive governmental action and vindicate constitutional 
rights. 
Historically, standing demanded only that the plaintiff possess a legal 
cause of action; it was neither necessary nor sufficient to identify a 
particularized injury.72 Under Warren Court precedents, Article III’s “case 
                                                                                                                       
requirement of adverseness. Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Windsor, the Bipartisan 
Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) did mount a defense of DOMA, but the Court oddly failed 
to address the question of BLAG’s standing. See id. at 2688 (“the Court need not decide 
whether BLAG would have standing to challenge the District Court’s ruling and its 
affirmance in the Court of Appeals on BLAG’s own authority”). 
68 See infra text accompanying notes 81–85. 
69 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661 (stating that “that the doctrine of standing “serves 
to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political 
branches” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
70 See id. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing “irony” that, “rather than 
recognize that justiciability exists to allow disputes of public policy to be resolved by the 
political process rather than the courts, here the Court refuses to allow a State’s authorized 
representatives to defend the outcome of a democratic election”).* 
71 Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Windsor reflects the generally conservative 
impulse to protect and enhance the power of the Executive. Despite what one imagines 
would be his strong disagreement with the Obama administration’s position on DOMA, 
Justice Scalia reaffirmed his belief in the President’s power to determine that a statute is 
unconstitutional, without judicial interference. 133 S. Ct. at 2702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“If what we say is true some Presidential determinations that statutes are unconstitutional 
will not be subject to our review. That is as it should be.”).* 
72 Sunstein, supra note 54, at 177–78, 182 (arguing that early English and American 
practices support simple test for standing, namely that “people have standing if the law has 
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or controversy” requirement was understood as requiring that the plaintiff 
have suffered an injury,73 but the needed injury was still understood to be a 
“legal wrong” rather than calling for a factual inquiry independent of law.74 
Moreover, the primary focus of this inquiry into the plaintiff’s “injury” was 
to ensure adverseness. As the Warren Court explained in Baker v. Carr, 
“the gist of the question of standing” is whether the claimant has “alleged 
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that 
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which 
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 
questions.”75 The Warren Court specifically rejected the idea that standing 
implicates the separation of powers.76 
The Burger Court ushered in two significant shifts in standing doctrine 
that served to limit constitutional claimants’ access to the federal courts: the 
first was a change in what constituted a sufficient “injury” for standing 
purposes; the second was to ground standing emphatically in separation of 
powers principles. The Burger Court inaugurated the first major shift in 
standing doctrine by presenting the existence of an “injury” as a question of 
fact, not law.77 This modification, Cass Sunstein argues, was not just new 
but disingenuous. “[The Burger] Court, and its successors (the Lujan [v. 
Defenders of Wildlife] Court among them), seem to assume that whether 
there is an ‘injury’ can be answered . . . as if the [question] depended on 
some brute fact, not on evaluation, and not on law. But this is false.”78 
Describing the inquiry as factual disguises the normative judgments that 
inevitably underlie the Court’s conclusions as to what counts as an 
                                                                                                                       
granted them a right to bring suit”). The Warren Court later expanded standing to 
encompass not only the objects of regulation but also its beneficiaries. Id. at 183 (“The 
shift in this . . . period began when courts interpreted the ‘legal wrong’ test to allow many 
people affected by government decisions — including beneficiaries of regulatory programs 
— to bring suit to challenge government action.”).  
73 The Court did not, however, use the term “injury in fact,” a phrase first employed in 
1970. Id. at 169. 
74 David M. Driesen, Standing For Nothing: The Paradox Of Demanding Concrete 
Context For Formalist Adjudication, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 808, 816 (2004); Sunstein, supra 
note 54, at 184. 
75 369 U.S. at 204; see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (quoting Baker, 369 at 204). 
76 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 99–101 (“The question whether a particular person is a proper 
party to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems 
related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of the 
Federal Government. . . . In terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the 
question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be 
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial 
resolution.”*). 
77 Sunstein, supra note 54, at 185–86. 
78 Id. at 188–89. 
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“injury.”79 The Burger Court further narrowed the “injury in fact” 
requirement to demand that this injury be (1) caused by the defendant and 
(2) likely to be redressed by a court decision in the claimant’s favor.80 
Beyond the requirement of injury in fact, the Court—in an about-face 
from Flast—began to speak of standing as motivated by separation of 
powers concerns.81 In particular, the Court sought to use standing to bar 
lawsuits it saw as challenging Executive branch power.82 In Allen v. Wright, 
for example, the Court declared that the causation and redressibility 
requirements were necessary to foreclose an expansion of challenges to 
governmental action that would ultimately render the federal courts 
“virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive 
action.”83 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court emphasized that 
“[v]indicating the public interest (including the public interest in 
government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of 
Congress and the Chief Executive” rather than the Court.84 Moreover, the 
Court went on, such a public interest could not be converted into an 
individual right through a legislative grant of standing, because such a 
legislative grant would yield the same, dangerous expansion of judicial 
power.85 
The Burger Court, followed by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, so 
successfully solidified the link between standing and Article III that it is 
                                                
79 As Sunstein argues, an African American claimant challenging a tax deduction to a 
segregated school, or an environmentalist objecting to the destruction of a pristine area, 
believes herself to have suffered a real injury. To deny this is to “import our own, value-
laden ideas about what things ought to count. We are not simply describing some fact about 
the world.”*Id. at 189; see also Cisneros, supra note 5, at 1113 (describing significant 
change in how Burger Court described the required injury).  
80 See, e.g. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Driesen, supra note 74, at 817. 
81 Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (1984) (“The law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic 
idea – the idea of separation of powers.”*). But see id. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“Once again, the Court uses standing to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs who 
are entitled to full consideration of their claims on the merits. And once again, the Court 
does so by waxing eloquent on considerations that provide little justification for the 
decision at hand. This time, however, the Court focuses on the idea of separation of 
powers, as if the mere incantation of that phrase provides an obvious solution to the 
difficult questions presented by these cases.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
82 Cisneros, supra note 5, at 1124; see also Sunstein, supra note 54, at 213 (“Lujan 
seems to be built in key part on the idea that citizen standing — like other legislative 
interference with the President’s power to execute the law is unacceptable under Article II. 
Indeed, many of the recent standing cases might be thought to be Article II cases 
masquerading under the guise of Article III.”). 
83 Allen, 468 U.S. at 760. 
84 504 U.S. 555, 576–77 (1992). 
85 Id. at 577. 
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easy to forget how recent—and far from self-evident—this linkage is.86 
“Article III contains no explicit constitutional requirement of ‘standing’ or 
‘personal stake.’ Nor does it ever refer to ‘injury in fact.’”87 Just as the now 
familiar three-part test for standing88 is not self-evidently compelled by the 
Constitution, neither is the idea that standing exists to enforce separation of 
powers principles.89 Injury in fact and separation of powers are concepts 
that are not clearly related to each other, let alone to standing.90 The Burger, 
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have used standing doctrine to roll back the 
rights-protective decisions of the Warren Court and empower the Executive 
Branch under the seemingly neutral guise of procedural decisionmaking.91 
Notwithstanding its odd posture, Hollingsworth not only applies, but builds 
upon, this dubious legacy. 
 
B.  A Lost Opportunity to Establish Equality 
 
Because a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that the amendment’s 
proponent’s lacked standing to appeal, the Court did not address the merits 
of the case. However, it is interesting to speculate why the Justices lined up 
as they did on the standing question, and what their position on the merits of 
the case may have been. 
Two conservative Justices would have proceeded to the merits. It is safe 
to assume that both Justices Thomas and Alito would have voted to uphold 
Prop 8. It is likewise not unreasonable to imagine that Justice Sotomayor 
was prepared to find Prop 8 unconstitutional. Many court watchers, 
however, had speculated that Justice Kennedy, who authored the strong 
dissent rejecting the Court’s standing dodge, would be the one pressing for 
a procedural way out.92 Justice Kennedy’s confused opinion for the majority 
                                                
86 See Driesen, supra note 74, at 823 (“this separation of powers rationale aims to 
explain why the Court reads Article III to require standing”); see alsoCisneros, supra note 
5, at 1110–11 (describing shift under which Court began to “tether its in-house rules of 
standing to Article III, elevating the inquiry from a prudential analysis to a constitutional 
one”*). 
87 Sunstein, supra note 54, at 168.  
88 This test requires that a plaintiff show injury-in-fact, causation, and redressibility. 
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661. 
89 See Cisneros, supra note 5, at 1117; see also Sunstein, supra note 54, at 216–17. 
90 See Driesen, supra note 74, at 825 (“The question of improper (judicial) interference 
(with the legislative and executive branches) properly focuses upon the merits, the political 
question doctrine, and questions of equitable discretion, not upon injuries to parties.”*).  
91 Cisneros, supra note 5, at 1124; Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 996–97 (1993); 
Allen, 468 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
92 See, e.g., James Oliphant, Supreme Court Rulings on Gay Marriage: A Liberal 
Result Wrapped in Conservative Values, The National Journal (June 27, 2013) available at 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/domesticpolicy/supreme-court-rulings-on-gay-marriage-a-
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in United States v. Windsor finding DOMA’s section 3 unconstitutional 
does not yield definitive insight into how Justice Kennedy would have 
decided the merits of Hollingsworth. On the one hand, the opinion 
reverberates with indignation at the injustices bans on same-sex marriages 
impose93 and suggests that these injustices are never permissible under the 
federal Constitution.94 Justice Scalia, for one, saw the majority opinion as a 
thinly disguised step toward ultimate recognition of same-sex couples’ 
constitutional right to marry.95 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy took 
pains to emphasize the states’ prerogative to define marriage and to remind 
the public that its opinion and holding are confined to those same-sex 
marriages that—so far—only a handful of states recognize as lawful.96 This 
suggests a respect for federalism and a desire to proceed in an incremental 
fashion, calling into question whether Justice Kennedy would have found it 
prudent to set a precedent that would invalidate the bans that the vast 
majority of states still enforce. 
Justice Ginsburg’s likely intentions are less opaque. It is not surprising 
that she would want to avoid the merits in Hollingsworth. Justice Ginsburg 
has not made a secret of her reservations about Roe v. Wade’s establishment 
of a constitutional right to abortion. Although she supports a woman’s right 
to choose to end her pregnancy, Justice Ginsburg believed that Roe 
circumvented a tide of political reform in the states, prompting counter-
productive political “backlash.”97 It is questionable whether abortion reform 
                                                                                                                       
liberal-result-wrapped-in-conservative-values-20130626(“Oddly enough, Kennedy 
dissented from the decision to punt the case on California’s Proposition 8”); Alexander 
Abad-Santos , The Atlantic Wire,First Word from the Supreme Court on Prop 8: The 
Justices Are Hedging(Mar. 26, 2013) available at 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2013/03/supreme-court-prop-8-arguments/63535/ 
(suggesting “that the key justice, Anthony Kennedy, may push for the Court to dismiss 
Prop. 8 or hand it back to the lower courts of California, wary of ‘uncharted waters’ in 
potentially redefining marriage in America”). 
93 See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (stating that the Court must decide whether 
section 3 of DOMA and its “resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential 
part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment”); id. at 2694 (DOMA’s 
differentiation among married couples “demeans the (same-sex) couple, whose moral and 
sexual choices the Constitution protects” and “humiliates tens of thousands of children now 
being raised by same-sex couples”*). 
94 See e.g., id. at 2693 (“DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to 
protect. By doing so it violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable 
to the Federal Government.”). 
95 Id. at 2710 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“no one should be fooled; it is just a matter of 
listening and waiting for the other shoe”). 
96 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690, 2691, 2693, 2695–96. 
97 Emily Bazelon, Backlash Whiplash, Slate (May 4, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/05/justice_ginsburg_a
nd_roe_v_wade_caution_for_gay_marriage.html. 
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would have continued in the absence of Roe, and whether such reform 
would have quieted opposition to abortion rights.98 But Justice Ginsburg’s 
view of Roeas politically premature strongly suggests that she would regard 
a decision establishing the right of same-sex couples to marry as similarly 
“too much, too soon.”99 Justices Breyer and Kagan may well have shared 
Justice Ginsburg’s reluctance to wade into the roiling public debate over 
marriage equality. 
Justice Ginsburg is often described as the leader of the current Court’s 
liberal wing.100 Her hesitation to reach the merits of Prop 8’s 
constitutionality is therefore a sign of how far right the Court has moved. 
As a final exercise in speculation, we can imagine how a liberal Justice in 
the mold of the Warren Court would have decided Hollingsworth. First, this 
archetypal liberal Justice would likely have recognized the proponents’ 
standing, and not just as a vehicle for reaching the merits. As discussed 
above, it has typically been a conservative position to foreclose access to 
courts through procedural vehicles such as standing. Indeed, besides 
California, two state supreme courts (Alaska and Montana) known for 
issuing liberal opinions101 have also ruled fairly recently that official 
initiative proponents possess the authority to defend the constitutionality of 
citizen initiatives.102 
Assuming our liberal Justice persuaded four others to join her in 
proceeding to the merits, she would next have urged her colleagues to 
declare, without shame or reluctance, that Prop 8 violates same-sex couples’ 
rights to equal protection and substantive due process.103 Our Justice would 
have recognized that, when fundamental constitutional rights are at stake, it 
is the United State Supreme Court’s responsibility to step in to protect these 
rights from majoritarian oppression. It is not surprising that the Court 
prefers to issue opinions on controversial issues only after it has a solid 
                                                
98 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Ginsburg, Roe v. Wade, and Same-Sex 
Marriage, The Huffington Post, The Blog (May 12, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/justice-ginsburg-roe-v-
wa_b_3264307.html (describing and disputing Justice Ginsburg’s account). 
99 See id.; Bazelon, supra note 97. 
100 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Heavyweight, The New Yorker, Mar. 11, 2013, at 40. 
101 See Kenneth Kirk, Alaska: Conservative State, Liberal Judiciary, Americans 
United for Life (2007), available at http://www.aul.org/docs/statecourts/AK.pdf; Rob 
Natelson, The Montana Supreme Court Ballot Issue Jurisprudence: “Liberal, Sí — 
Conservative, No!,” Montana Policy Institute (Mar. 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.montanapolicy.org/2013/03/rob-natelson-the-montana-supreme-court-ballot-
issue-jurisprudence-liberal-si-conservative-no/. 
102 See Sportsmen for I-143 v. Fifteenth Jud. Ct., 40 P.3d 400 (Mont. 2002); Alaskans 
for a Common Language Inc. v. Kritz, 3 P.3d 906 (Alaska 2000). 
103 See Sportsmen for I-143 v. Fifteenth Jud. Ct., 40 P.3d 400 (Mont. 2002); Alaskans 
for a Common Language Inc. v. Kritz, 3 P.3d 906 (Alaska 2000). 
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sense of how the political winds are blowing. But such hesitation amounts 
to a shirking of one of the Court’s most important responsibilities. Roe v. 
Wade, while not as controversial in 1973 as often portrayed,104 did preempt 
political resolutions of the abortion issue. Because of this, women in states 
like North Dakota, Alabama, and Mississippi have benefited from forty 
years of access to safe, legal abortions, access that these states would never 
have provided on their own initiative. Today, same-sex couples in most 
states must hope for political reform or await the Court’s next move. If the 
Court fails to act, couples in the most conservative states could be waiting 
for a long time. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the giddy aftermath of the DOMA and Prop 8 decisions, it was 
tempting for supporters of marriage equality to breathe a sigh of relief at the 
Court’s opinion in Perry v. Hollingsworth. But the decision ought at least to 
give us pause. Hollingsworth produced a thorough “mish-mash” of 
conservatives and liberals on the standing question.105 It may be that each 
Justice would have reached his or her decision regardless of the merits 
looming on the other side of this procedural hurdle.  Certainly Justice Scalia 
has been consistent—and remained so in both Perry and Windsor—in 
preferring to keep access to federal courts tightly controlled.106 But it is 
likely that at least some Justices, as well commentators, were influenced by 
their eagerness for or fear of having the Court reach the merits. 
It is understandable that Justices, litigators, and scholars who believe in 
the right to marriage equality were loathe to see the Court take up this issue 
too soon and thereby risk an adverse decision that could set back 
recognition of a federal right.107 At the same time, it is important to 
recognize the Court’s decision on the procedural question for what it is. The 
Court sacrificed a liberal commitment to broader citizen access to the 
federal court for pragmatic purposes, reinforcing and lending legitimacy to 
the conservative trend of tightening Article III standing requirements. The 
precedent Perry establishes could negatively affect citizens’ ability to 
                                                
104 See Stone, supra note 98. The decision in Roe was 7–2 and was joined by then 
Chief Justice Burger. See 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
105 See Oliphant, supra note 92.  
106 Sunstein, supra note 54 (tracing Justice Scalia’s position on standing to a law 
review article written when he was a law professor). 
107 See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join to Fight Gay Marriage Ban, 
N.Y. Times (May 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/us/28marriage.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0 (quoting 
Jennifer C. Pizer, marriage project director for Lambda Legal, calling the case “risky and 
premature”). 
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defend progressive laws that establish or enhance, rather than constrict, 
rights.108 It also reinforces existing limitations upon citizens’ ability to 
challenge laws that violate important rights or that harm the environment or 
other public resources.109 In the meantime, we must not forget that 
innumerable gay couples across the country who desire marriage are still 
waiting for formal, and equal, state recognition of their relationships. 
 
* * * 
 
 
                                                
108 Citizen initiatives have arguably not lived up to the progressive principles they 
were meant to vindicate. See Thomas E. Cronin, The Paradoxes and Politics of Citizen 
Initiatives, 34 Willamette L. Rev. 733, 734–35 (1998) (noting paradox that, while citizen 
initiatives were meant to curb the power of special interests, historical proponents of 
initiatives “would be appalled by how some of today’s single-interest groups in practice 
have stirred racial, ethnic, religious, and class antagonisms, rather than rallied the citizens 
around unifying progressive policies”). Whether the initiative system needs reform or even 
elimination is a separate question from whether, if a state’s citizens choose to retain such a 
system, the state is entitled to ensure that adopted initiatives are defended in court. See id. 
at 734 (describing continuing broad public support for citizen initiatives both in initiative 
states and nationally). 
109 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. 555; see also Sunstein, supra note 54. 
 
